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INTRODUCTION
“If they catch a fraud—they are beasts from the pits of hell. You
do not want to do this.”1 As demonstrated by this advice from one
immigration lawyer to a prospective client considering using a
“pretend” marriage to get a green card,2 federal immigration
authorities do not take fraud lightly. Incendiary rhetoric of rampant
immigration benefit fraud litters governmental publications and
testimony3 as well as the mainstream media.4 Without looking at
the evidence, people may easily believe that aliens5 use fraudulent
1. Joshua Daley Paulin, Fraudulent Marriages in Immigration Cases, 27 GPSOLO 1, 40,
43 (2010).
2. Id. 
3. See Aftermath of Fraud by Immigration Attorneys: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 25 (2012)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Chris Crane, President, Nat’l Immigration & Customs
Enforcement Council 118) (“CIS supervisors are aware that fraud occurs daily, but no action
is taken.”); Oversight of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Hearing Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) [hereinafter Oversight] (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch)
(“I continue to have concerns about the prevalent abuses in our country’s marriage-based
green card program. Now, it could easily be called the soft underbelly of our country’s visa
program.”); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-08-09, REVIEW OF THE
USCIS BENEFIT FRAUD REFERRAL PROCESS 4 (2008) (“[A]ccording to ICE, ‘benefit fraud is an
extremely lucrative form of white-collar crime that is complex and challenging to investigate,
often ... tak[ing] years to investigate and prosecute.’ ”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-06-259, IMMIGRATION BENEFITS: ADDITIONAL CONTROLS AND A SANCTIONS STRATEGY
COULD ENHANCE DHS’S ABILITY TO CONTROL BENEFIT FRAUD, “Highlights” (2006) (“Although
the full extent of benefit fraud is unknown, available evidence suggests that it is a serious
problem.”).
4. See Paulin, supra note 1, at 41 (“We hear from U.S. citizens who complain about the
fact that they’ve been lured into a marriage by someone seeking the opportunity to obtain a
green card, and then splitting.... You don’t have any idea how much fraud is going on
undetected.”) (quoting Jack Martin of the Federation for American Immigration Reform);
Michelle Malkin, The Jihadis’ Marriage-Fraud Scam, FOX NEWS (May 5, 2010), http://www.
foxnews.com/opinion/2010/05/05/michelle-malkin-times-square-bomb-plot-jihadis-marriage-
scam/ (“Jihadists have been gaming the sham-marriage racket for years....  Marriage fraud
remains a treacherous path of least resistance.”).
5. Throughout this Note, any references to “aliens” or “immigrants” should be taken to
mean those persons who are either overstayers (persons who enter the country with a legal
temporary or student visa, or legally without a visa, and remain in the country past their
“authorized periods of admission”) or those with provisional green cards, and not immigrants
who have illegally entered the country. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-411,
OVERSTAY ENFORCEMENT: ADDITIONAL MECHANISMS FOR COLLECTING, ASSESSING, AND
SHARING DATA COULD STRENGTHEN DHS’S EFFORTS BUT WOULD HAVE COSTS 1 (2011).
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marriages to pilfer green cards left and right, or that finding a bona
fide marriage between a U.S. citizen and an immigrant would be
tantamount to finding the Holy Grail. However, the evidence shows
a much different picture of marriage fraud than the bombast
suggests.6
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet
Napolitano herself remarked on this dichotomy between the
fictional and factual in a Senate hearing, stating that although
“there is a perception that marriage fraud is ... rampant, ... most
marriages coming before [United States Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Services (USCIS)] are bona fide.”7 Statistics corroborate
Secretary Napolitano’s statement.8 Marriage fraud and, more
generally, immigration benefit fraud are actually quite elusive.9 For
example, take data from 2006: out of the approximately 5 million
applications for immigration benefits, denials for fraud constituted
less than 3 percent.10 Further evidence indicates the number of
applications denied for marriage fraud actually may be lower than
the number of applications denied for fraud generally.11
6. See Nina Bernstein, Do You Take This Immigrant?, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/nyregion/13fraud.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(“[E]xaggerated estimates of marriage fraud over the years have created a bureaucratic
monster, thwarting legitimate, if unconventional, couples and spurring unconstitutional
intrusion into their lives.”).
7. Oversight, supra note 3, at 8.
8. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 3, at 11; Bernstein, supra note 6
(“Nationwide, the number of such petitions denied for fraud is tiny: 506 of the 241,154 filed
by citizens in the last fiscal year, or two-tenths of 1 percent.”).
9. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 3, at 15 (“Congress has been told by [Fraud
Detection and National Security (FDNS)] that there is a bunch of fraud, so Congress is asking
for the proof. HQ FDNS is asking the field to find the fraud so it can be shown to Congress.
And I sense HQ FDNS’ [sic] frustration with the field because we aren’t finding it.”).
10. Id. at 11.
11. Erica Pearson, Proving Love to the Feds: Inside the Unit That Makes Sure Green Card
Marriages Are Real, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 27, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/immigration-fraud-agency-green-card-marriages-real-article-1.1064417#ixzz29rnCEPEd
(stating that of the 270,761 “applications for marriage-based green cards, nationwide” in 2011,
only 3924 cases, or 1.4 percent, were found to be fraudulent). The government’s statistics
concerning marriage fraud are obscure at best. For example, USCIS completed an audit of
marriage fraud in 2007, but never released the results. Bernstein, supra note 6. The New York
Times, when trying to investigate the actual prevalence of marriage fraud, requested the 2007
audit from USCIS and was constructively denied the information. Id. (“An agency audit of
marriage fraud, conducted in 2007, has never been released. When The New York Times filed
a request for such data under the Freedom of Information Act, the agency identified 656
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Regardless of the evidence indicating that benefit fraud occurs
less often than assumed, the federal government has only increased
its emphasis on cracking down on this kind of fraud.12 However, as
resources continue to pour into governmental agencies designed
specifically to combat benefit fraud, such as the Fraud Detection
and National Security Directorate (FDNS),13 fraud remains difficult
to uncover.14 This pressure from above to find the fraud, combined
with the public’s strong interest in illegal immigration,15 could
conceivably incentivize FDNS to cut corners in order to bolster its
fraud detection statistics.
One area in which the conduct of FDNS might raise cause for
concern is its policy of conducting unannounced visits to the homes
of couples applying for marriage-based immigration benefits.16 The
administration uses “dawn bed checks” to catch the applicants
relevant pages, but blacked out 655, saying the information would disclose the deliberative
process or law enforcement techniques. The Times has appealed.”).
12. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Sarah Kendall, Assoc. Dir., FDNS)
(“USCIS has undertaken significant steps to protect the integrity of the Nation’s immigration
system and to help safeguard our Nation’s security.... This allows us to strengthen our
standard operating procedures and reduce program vulnerabilities.”); Oversight, supra note
3, at 7 (statement of Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., USCIS) (“As part of the elevation of the Fraud
Detection and National Security Directorate earlier this year, one of the things that we are
doing is bringing increased attention to our Benefit Fraud Compliance Assessment Program.
One of the areas that we will be focused upon in that renewed assessment and review process
is on the marriage fraud issue.”); Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.uscis.gov (search “FDNS”; then
follow “Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate” link) (“[USCIS] created FDNS in
2004 in order to strengthen USCIS’s efforts to ensure immigration benefits are not granted
to individuals who pose a threat to national security or public safety, or who seek to defraud
our immigration system. In 2010, FDNS was promoted to a Directorate which elevated the
profile of this work within USCIS, brought about operational improvements, and enhanced
the integration of the FDNS mission in all facets of the agency’s work.”).
13. Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, supra note 12.
14. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
15. In a 2012 Presidential Election Poll, 5 percent of voters stated that immigration, over
choices such as “jobs” and the “deficit,” was the issue that mattered the most to them in
deciding for whom to cast their votes. Problems and Priorities, POLLINGREPORT.COM,
http://www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
16. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE FRAUD DETECTION
AND NATIONAL SECURITY DATA SYSTEM 3 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/privacy/privacy_pia_cis_fdns.pdf; Administrative Site Visit and Verification Program,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/about-us/directorates-and-
program-offices/fraud-detection-and-national-security/administrative-site-visit-and-verific
ation-program (last updated Aug. 18, 2010).
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unaware, in the hopes of exposing fraudulent couples.17 In allowing
FDNS to capitalize on the element of surprise, however, immigra-
tion attorneys who supervise FDNS agents are arguably violating
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2.18 Model Rule 4.2 prohibits
attorney, or attorney-supervised, contact with represented
persons—here the applicants applying for marriage-based immigra-
tion benefits.19
This Note seeks to explore whether federal immigration attorneys
engage in unethical conduct by permitting government personnel to
overreach in their investigation of atypical fraud. First, this Note
will examine the structure of the federal government’s regulation of
marriage fraud, especially in the context of FDNS home visits.
Second, this Note will outline Model Rule 4.2 and its applicability
to federal immigration lawyers. Then, this Note will discuss the
question of whether these attorneys are violating Model Rule 4.2,
and, if so, what constitutes the proper remedy for such a violation.
The conclusion contends that FDNS attorneys are in violation of
Model Rule 4.2 and that the proper remedy for such violations is the
suppression of any evidence obtained through these unethical home
visits.
This Note is novel in both its argument and conclusion. The lack
of scholarship on this particular topic is surprising given the high
volume of applications for immigration benefits20 and the important
consequences of a denial. In crafting this Note, the author was able
to find only one case with any allusion to the potentially unethical
behavior by FDNS and USCIS attorneys.21 Why immigration
practioners have not raised a Model Rule 4.2 defense to evidence
obtained through FDNS home visits remains a mystery.22 The
answer to that question—why immigration attorneys do not appeal
17. Bernstein, supra note 6 (“ ‘Someone shows up at your house with a badge and a gun,
unannounced,’ said Laura Lichter, an immigration lawyer in Denver. ‘Hi, we’re here from
immigration. Do you mind if we come in to look and see if two towels are wet?’ ”).
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2013).
19. Id.
20. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 3, at 4, 11.
21. See Berrios v. Holder, 502 F. App’x 100, 103 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that USCIS
disclaimed any reliance on evidence obtained by the government’s visit to the petitioner’s
home). The fact that the government disavowed probative evidence found at the petitioner’s
home suggests the possibility that the government doubted the admissibility of the evidence. 
22.  E-mail from Glenn Formica, Esq., to author (on file with author).
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to this defense more often—likely falls somewhere between the
novelty of the argument and the uncertainty of the assumptions
underlying this Note’s conclusion.23 But novelty of argument should
not be mistaken for incorrectness; this argument is meritorious and
should be utilized by immigration attorneys whenever possible. The
pressure for federal officials to find fraud continues to mount, but is
engaging in unethical conduct the answer?
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF MARRIAGE FRAUD
Federal regulation of immigration spans many years and has
involved different administrative agencies. From 1903 to 1940, the
Department of Labor (DOL) regulated immigration24 until the
Executive branch transferred authority over immigration and
naturalization to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1940.25 The
DOJ continued to regulate immigration until 2003 when, in
response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress
created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).26 In creating
DHS, Congress amalgamated twenty-two different federal organiza-
tions, either in their entirety or in part, in the hopes of creating a
“unified, integrated Department.”27 DHS divides its control over
immigration and naturalization in a tripartite fashion; the three
relevant components are Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and USCIS.28 USCIS
is responsible for adjudicating immigration benefits, including those
stemming from an alien’s marriage to a U.S. citizen.29
Marriage to a U.S. citizen confers on an alien spouse the ability
to file for a green card, entitling the holder to the right to live and
23. Id. 
24. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 239-40 (7th ed. 2012). 
25. Id. 
26. Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
27. Who Joined DHS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-
dhs (last visited Mar. 29, 2014); see also Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2135.
28. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 24, at 240, 242, 244, 246-47.
29. Id. at 247, 306-07. 
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work in the United States.30 The first step for an alien spouse to
obtain a green card is for the citizen spouse to file an I-130 Petition
for Alien Relative.31 Under American law, visas for immediate
relatives are so favored that the government does not impose
numerical limitations on their issuance.32 Of the different subcate-
gories of “immediate relatives”33 encompassed by I-130 petitions,
spouses are by far the most common.34 However, an approved I-130
does not in and of itself bestow upon the alien spouse a green card;
rather, the approved petition simply establishes the legal and
genuine relationship between the citizen and alien necessary for a
green card.35
Each year, almost one-third of all immigrants who receive
immigration benefits do so by reason of marriage to an American
citizen.36 However, not every marriage to an American citizen
provides a carte blanche for alien beneficiaries. Federal agents must
deem the marriage bona fide or legitimate for the alien to receive,
and also to keep, immigration benefits.37 Specifically, federal
authorities seek to keep at bay “sham marriages”—marriages
entered into solely for the purpose of conferring immigration
benefits on the alien partner.38 USCIS can deny any petition if it
30. Id. at 316. 
31. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (“[A]ny citizen of the United States claiming that
an alien is entitled to classification by reason of a relationship described in ... this title or to
an immediate relative status ... may file a petition with the Attorney General for such
classification.”).
32. Id. § 1151(b) (“Aliens described in this subsection, who are not subject to the
worldwide levels or numerical limitations of subsection (a) of this section [include] ...
immediate relatives.”); id. § 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i) (defining “immediate relatives”).
33. Id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (“[T]he term ‘immediate relatives’ means the children, spouses,
and parents of a citizen of the United States.”).
34. In 2011, of the 453,158 green cards awarded to immediate relatives of U.S. citizens,
more than half (258,320) were to spouses. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2011 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 18 (2012), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/yearbook/
2011/ois_yb_2011.pdf.
35. Park v. Gonzales, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156 (D. Or. 2006).
36. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 24, at 306. 
37. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1).
38. See id. §§ 1154(c), 1186a(b)(1); Stokes v. INS, 393 F. Supp. 24, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(“[The federal regulations are] designed to discourage marriages of convenience, entered into
with both eyes on the statute, and designed solely to confer the riches of preferential
immigration status as a dowry.”).
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determines the marriage is fraudulent, and it may review an I-130
petition of a conditional permanent alien resident for up to two
years after the petition is granted.39 Furthermore, even in the case
of nonconditional permanent residents, the government may deport
the alien if the Attorney General believes the marriage underlying
the alien’s procurement of a visa is or was fraudulent.40
USCIS was so concerned about marriage fraud, and immigra-
tion benefit fraud generally, that in 2004 it created FDNS, which
in 2010 was raised to a Directorate.41 Directorates are generally
more powerful “director led departments in charge of multiple
divisions.”42 FDNS is charged with “detecting and removing known
and suspected fraud from the application process.”43 In an effort to
effectuate its mission, FDNS regularly subjects alien petitioners to
background checks and other “[a]dministrative inquiries,” which
include “[t]argeted site visits ... where fraud is suspected.”44
39. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1). Section 1186a(b)(1) allows DHS two years from when it
grants the alien lawful permanent residency to revoke such residency if the qualifying
marriage is terminated, annulled, or determined fraudulent. Id. (“In the case of an alien with
permanent resident status on a conditional basis[,] ... if the Secretary of Homeland Security
determines, before the second anniversary of the alien’s obtaining the status of lawful
admission for permanent residence, that—(A) the qualifying marriage—(i) was entered into
for the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission as an immigrant, or (ii) has been judicially
annulled or terminated, other than through the death of a spouse[,] ... the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall so notify the parties involved and ... shall terminate the permanent
resident status of the alien (or aliens) involved as of the date of the determination.”).
Conditional permanent resident status is conferred only on those applicants who receive a
green card by reason of a marriage that is less than two years old. See id. § 1186(a)(1), (b)(1).
However, since USCIS may take years in adjudicating an I-130 petition, the actual time-
period in which an alien must remain married in order to receive or keep their benefits may
be much longer. See Berrios v. Holder, 502 F. App’x 100, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (determining
USCIS took almost a year to deny applicant’s I-130 petition, and it was not until the applicant
filed a writ of mandamus that a denial was issued).
40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G).
41. See Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, supra note 12.
42. Directorates and Program Offices, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/ (click “About Us”; then “Directorates and Program
Offices” on the left side of the screen) (last updated July 28, 2010).
43. Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, supra note 12.
44. Id. 
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A. Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner? Home Visits in Cases of 
Suspected Marriage Fraud
One area in which FDNS utilizes site or home visits is the
marriage fraud context. If the immigration official has doubts after
the standard initial I-130 interview in which USCIS questions the
couple about their marriage, the official can take subsequent
measures including a follow-up “fraud” interview with the appli-
cants or an investigative, surprise home visit.45 Although FDNS has
not published any data on how often it performs home visits, one
practitioner estimated that in 90 percent of his cases in which
FDNS was involved, FDNS visited either the residence or place of
employment listed on the application for benefits.46 Additionally, in
30 percent of those visits, FDNS conducted an ex parte interview
with the represented applicant without counsel present.47
Even though immigration authorities claim that these subsequent
investigations are “designed to give couples the benefit of the
doubt,” in that those couples that did poorly in the initial interview
are given a second chance,48 these subsequent investigations are
usually very judgmental of, and intrusive into, the couple’s relation-
ship.49 For all the embarrassment and scrutiny these couples are
forced to undergo, a very small amount of fraud is detected.50
45. See ILONA BRAY, FIANCÉ AND MARRIAGE VISAS: A COUPLE’S GUIDE TO U.S. IMMIGRATION
308 (7th ed. 2012); Bernstein, supra note 6. Typically the applicant, if represented, is allowed
to bring their attorney or similar party to any subsequent formal “fraud” interview. BRAY,
supra. This Note focuses on only the unannounced home visits in which the applicant’s
representative may not be present. 
46. E-mail from Glenn Formica, Esq., to author, supra note 22.
47. Id. 
48. Pearson, supra note 11.
49. See BRAY, supra note 45, at 309, 312; Bernstein, supra note 6; Pearson, supra note 11.
Sample questions from fraud interviews include everything from the routine (“What did the
two of you do last New Year’s Eve?”) to the intimately personal (“What form of contraception
(birth control) do you use?”). BRAY, supra note 45, at 312.
50. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. Although federal authorities have had
success in uncovering “nuptial scam rings” in major cities like Chicago and Seattle, the overall
number of I-130s denied for fraud is very small: only 0.2 of 1 percent of all petitions filed by
citizens in the fiscal year of 2011. Bernstein, supra note 6; Melissa Naan Burke, To Have and
to Hold a Green Card, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2006, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/
issues/January-February-2006/scene_burke_janfeb06.msp.
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In addition to being a waste of resources, these subsequent
investigations may also represent unethical behavior on behalf of
attorneys in the Office of the Chief Counsel (OCC) of USCIS or the
Office of the General Counsel (OGC) of DHS. OCC is the legal entity
directly responsible for supervising USCIS and its components, such
as FDNS, in the day-to-day operations of the agency.51 Because
USCIS and FDNS are subcomponents of DHS, OGC provides
additional supervision as to the legality of the actions taken by
USCIS and FDNS.52 Hence, OCC and OGC share responsibility for
the actions of USCIS and its agents, and for ensuring those actions
are in compliance with the law. However, the “law” in this context
does not refer only to statutes and the Constitution but also includes
certain ethical guidelines. These ethics laws, known as the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, are promulgated through the
American Bar Association’s Center for Professional Responsibility53
and are applicable to federal government attorneys.54 Of special
relevance to the investigations by FDNS is Model Rule 4.2, which
51. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE FRAUD
DETECTION AND NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE (2012), available at http://www.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy_pia_uscis_fdns_july2012.pdf (“[T]he
USCIS ... Office of the Chief Counsel [OCC] advise[s] FDNS on the ... legal considerations of
policies and initiatives.”).
52. Office of the General Counsel (OGC) Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/office-general-counsel (last visited Mar. 29, 2014) (“[General Counsel of
DHS] is ultimately responsible for all of the Department’s legal determinations and for
overseeing all of its attorneys.”).
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
54. In 1998, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 530B, the McDade Amendment, which explicitly
states that “[a]n attorney for the Government” is “subject to State laws and rules ... in each
State where such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties.” 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2006).
Additionally, DHS and USCIS recognize that their attorneys are bound by state bar ethics
rules. See Memorandum from Jeff Conklin, Chief Info. Officer, USCIS, to Katherine Astrich,
Desk Officer, USCIS (July 15, 2008), available at http://bit.ly/pG80HI. Every state except
California, which has its own professional rules of conduct, has adopted some version of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.
html (last visited Mar. 29, 2014). Because every state imposes ethical obligations on attorneys
that practice within its borders, federal government attorneys nationwide are bound to some
form of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
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deals with attorney communications with opposing represented
persons.55
II. MODEL RULE 4.2: CONTACT WITH REPRESENTED PERSONS
The text of Model Rule 4.2 is as follows:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about
the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows
to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do
so by law or a court order.56
Model Rule 4.2 ensures that, for the most part, the opposing party
may not contact represented persons without the consent of the
represented person’s counsel. The Rule is designed to protect those
persons who sought out, or whom the court has assigned, represen-
tation from “overreaching” by opposing counsel.57 Because the
common client likely is not as legally sophisticated as a savvy
lawyer, the Rule seeks to level the playing field by forcing attorneys
to seek out their opposing counterparts, as opposed to their clients,
before and during litigation.58 The Rule also seeks to preserve the
legal system by both protecting the attorney-client privilege and
allowing for effective representation of clients.59
It is important to note that the Model Rules cover not just ethical
violations of the lawyer, but also ethical violations of any nonlawyer
that the lawyer supervises.60 Under Model Rule 5.3, a lawyer is
55. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2. 
56. Id. 
57. Id.
58. See Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(holding that Rule 4.2 both prevents lawyers from prompting “unwise statements” from
opposing parties and protects the attorney-client privilege); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 1 (“This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system
by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter against
possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by
those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship and the uncounselled disclosure of
information relating to the representation.”).
59. Polycast Tech. Corp., 129 F.R.D. at 625-27; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2
cmt. 1; see supra note 47 and accompanying text (noting the high instance of ex parte
communication in the I-130 context). 
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3.
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responsible for unethical conduct of another if the lawyer “orders, or
with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct” of
the other person.61 Because OCC and OGC oversee the legality of
the conduct of FDNS62 and therefore have or should have actual
knowledge of the activities of FDNS,63 the Model Rules would likely
hold OCC and OGC lawyers liable if home visits by FDNS are
unethical and if OCC and OGC have made no discernable efforts to
stop those visits.
A. Model Rule 4.2’s “Authorized by Law” Exception
There are some important caveats, however, to the Rule’s
application. As the text of the Rule indicates, some communications
with represented persons without the consent of their counsel may
be “authorized by law.” This exception usually pertains to govern-
mental officers engaged in “investigative activities prior to the
commencement of criminal or civil enforcement.”64 Although this
exemption seems to encompass the activities of FDNS—government
investigations conducted before commencement of immigration
enforcement proceedings, assuming enforcement proceedings refer
to deportation or removal65—in actuality such agent contact with
represented persons without the consent of their attorney runs
61. Id. (“(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if: (1) the lawyer
orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved.”). Model
Rule 5.3 does not appear to be limited to a lawyer’s supervision of a nonlawyer’s purely legal
work; rather the Rule refers to the nonlawyer’s “conduct.” Id. “Conduct” could then encompass
even FDNS’s purely investigatory actions. 
62. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
63. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 5 (“Communications authorized by law
may also include investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities,
directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil
enforcement proceedings.”).
65. If instead “enforcement” proceedings mean the determination of an alien’s I-130
petition, however, this exception most certainly does not apply to visits by FDNS because
these visits usually occur after the initial interview, once USCIS has commenced their
decision-making process. Burke, supra note 50. Additionally, these visits could conceivably
extend up to two years after the I-130 petition is approved because, under the Immigration
Fraud Amendments, there is a two-year window after approval of the petition in which the
Attorney General can determine whether the qualifying marriage was in fact fraudulent.
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (2006)).
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contrary to the federal regulations controlling immigration proceed-
ings.66 The pertinent regulation states, “Whenever an examination
is provided for in this chapter [regarding the Department of
Homeland Security], the person involved shall have the right to be
represented by an attorney or representative.”67 Because the on-
point federal regulation does not allow DHS to “examine”—or in
other words, to interview—immigrants in DHS proceedings without
affording them the right to representation or to have their represen-
tative present,68 home visits conducted without regard to that right
cannot be “authorized by law.” If the law does not authorize FDNS
to attempt to interview represented persons purposely without the
knowledge or consent of their attorneys, then, by definition, such
interviews are not covered under Model Rule 4.2’s exemption for
“communications authorized by law.”
B. Model Rule 4.2’s “Actual Knowledge” Requirement
Another important caveat to Model Rule 4.2 is that the lawyer
contacting the represented person must have “actual knowledge” of
their representation.69 This means that if a lawyer does not know
the client is represented, the court cannot discipline him. OCC and
OGC lawyers might argue that because FDNS is the agency
contacting and interviewing these applicants, they have no knowl-
edge of which applicants FDNS talks to or whether those persons
are represented. However, as previously discussed, OGC and OCC
are tasked with overseeing the actions of FDNS and therefore
should not be allowed to assert a defense of ignorance.70 Further-
more, actual knowledge of representation can be inferred from the
circumstances.71 In the case of applicants for immigration benefits,
66. 8 C.F.R. § 292.5 (2013). 
67. Id. 
68. Id.
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 8 (“The prohibition on communications
with a represented person only applies in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the
person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has
actual knowledge of the fact of representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred
from the circumstances.”).
70. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
71. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FACT SHEET: WHO CAN
REPRESENT ALIENS IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http://www.
justice.gov/eoir/press/09/WhoCanRepresentAliensFactSheet10022009.pdf; G-28, Notice of
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there should be no question that OCC and OGC lawyers have
actual, or inferred, knowledge of an applicant’s represented status
because counsel for alien petitioners must file notice of their entry
of appearance either through a G-28, G-28I, EOIR-27, or EOIR-28.72
Because OCC and OGC either know or should know that an
applicant is represented, the court should not excuse their subse-
quent contact with a represented person under a claim of ignorance.
As Model Rule 4.2 applies to attorneys who work for the federal
government and Model Rule 5.3 extends responsibility to supervis-
ing attorneys for nonlawyers’ conduct, OCC and OGC are responsi-
ble under the Model Rules for the actions of FDNS agents under
their supervision. Furthermore, because neither of the relevant
exceptions to the Rule apply to OCC’s or OGC’s conduct in authoriz-
ing FDNS home visits, OCC and OGC must act in conformity with
Model Rule 4.2 and ensure FDNS agents do the same.
III. GOVERNMENT’S VIOLATION OF MODEL RULE 4.2
Home visits by FDNS are strategically unannounced.73 Because
these visits are a surprise to the applicants, it follows that these
visits are also a surprise to their counsel. Looking at the plain text
of Model Rule 4.2, these visits are communications “about the
subject of the representation” with an applicant whom OCC or OGC
knows is represented, without the “consent of the other lawyer.”74
Accordingly, OCC and OGC attorneys are in violation of Model 4.2
in authorizing these visits.
On the other hand, there is no evidence that FDNS would object
if the applicant called his attorney at the time FDNS showed up at
his home.75 Even if it were the case that FDNS would not object to
Entry of Appearance, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/g-28 (last
updated June 11, 2013); G-28I, Notice of Entry of Appearance, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/g-28i (last updated May 2, 2013).
72. See supra note 71.
73. See Bernstein, supra note 6.
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2.
75. For example, in the H1-B work visa context, in which FDNS conducts site visits
to the employer to ensure the petition is accurate and not fraudulent, immigration
advocates promote such phone calls as steps an employer should take if FDNS appears.
See Alan Seagrave, H-1B Compliance: The FDNS Site Visit, LAB. & EMP. L. PERSP. (Aug. 30,
2010), http://www.laboremploymentperspectives.com/2010/08/30/h-1b-compliance-the-fdns-
site-visit/; On-Site H-1B Fraud Investigations on the Rise, IMMIGR. L. ASSOCIATES P.C.,
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an applicant calling his counsel and suspending its investigation
until counsel gave consent or came to the site, this USCIS safety
valve comes with its own set of problems.
First, FDNS agents might be able to observe or obtain evidence
while waiting for counsel’s consent or appearance. Second, there is
no guarantee that the applicant would know to call counsel or be
able to reach counsel, or that counsel would be available to come
and supervise the visit. Although an applicant could refuse to allow
the officers into his home without counsel, that seems unlikely given
the power dynamics at play. Marriage fraud interviews are “high-
stakes”76 contests with USCIS holding all the cards.77 Because
applicants try their hardest to please immigration authorities,78 it
seems unlikely that, given the serious consequences of a denial,79
they would risk annoying or displeasing FDNS officials by calling
counsel or asking to postpone the interview.
Finally, language barriers play a large role in USCIS proceedings;
in 2011, 82 percent of immigration hearings were completed in one
of 299 non-English languages.80 The high probability that the
applicant’s first language is not English, or that the applicant is not
competent enough in English to understand what FDNS is doing at
http://www.immig-chicago.com/articles/on-site-h-1b-fraud-investigations-on-the-rise/ (last
visited Mar. 29, 2014) (“The H-1B employer can request the presence of their immigration
attorney during the site visit; if he/she cannot be physically present, the attorney may be
present via teleconference while the site visit is conducted.”). 
76. Pearson, supra note 11.
77. See Bernstein, supra note 6 (“While Stokes makes such home visits off-limits in New
York State, lawyers and immigrant advocates complain that, at its worst, the process is a
Kafkaesque version of ‘The Newlywed Game,’ with dire consequences: those who fail can be
put on a path to deportation. Couples’ futures together depend on proving separately to a
skeptical bureaucrat that, as the law states, they did not marry ‘solely’ for a green card.... The
questions [from immigration officials] can be arbitrary and very detailed, and [the applicants
are] on the firing line right now.... If a certain number of questions are answered incorrectly
... they can stop the interview right there.”) (internal quotations omitted).
78. See Pearson, supra note 11 (“[One couple] brought two rolling suitcases with them. I
said, ‘Oh, sir are you traveling?’ ” [the USCIS interviewer] recalled. “And the guy unzips this
— zip zip zip. It was like, photo albums, statements from friends, college stuff, they went to
the same college. Two suitcases with evidence.”).
79. Id. (“[W]hen a pair crosses the line into clear fraud, the beneficiary is sent packing and
the petitioner could face criminal prosecution.”). Perhaps the most important consequence of
USCIS denying an applicant’s I-130 petition for fraud is that any subsequent I-130 petitions
the applicant files must be summarily denied. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (2012).
80. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2011 STATISTICAL
YEAR BOOK, at F1 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy11syb.pdf.
2270 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:2255
their home or what they are asking, means that applicants are
likely incapable of either determining that they need their lawyer
present or asking FDNS to let them call their lawyer. Given the
myriad of potential problems with FDNS relying on applicants
asking for counsel during site visits, FDNS should not assume that
affording applicants that option precludes any potential violations
of Model Rule 4.2.
A. OCC’s and OGC’s Escape Clauses
Although there is a case that OCC and OGC are acting in
violation of Model Rule 4.2, the offices might still be able to perform
unannounced home visits if one of two things is true: (1) the
relevant court distinguishes between lawyer and nonlawyer
representation for applicants, or (2) the court deems that applicants,
in signing their petition for an immediate relative visa, gave consent
to FDNS to perform these unannounced home visits, knowing their
counsel might not be present.
1. Differentiating Representation by Nonlawyers
One possible defense USCIS might invoke is that Model Rule 4.2
does not apply in situations when, although the applicant is
represented, that representation is by a layperson as opposed to an
actual lawyer. In immigration proceedings only about half of
applicants are represented.81 However, not all represented appli-
cants are represented by “lawyers” in the traditional understanding
of the word.82 Representation in immigration court can come in a
81. EOIR estimates that for the fiscal year of 2011, 51 percent of individuals in removal
proceedings were represented. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
supra note 80, at G1. Although 51 percent may seem like a small percentage, when considered
in light of the 202,479 relatives of citizens who applied for immediate relative visas, 51
percent becomes a much more significant 103,264 people. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM I-130-FIELD OFFICE ALIEN RELATIVE PETITIONS:
RECEIPTS, COMPLETIONS, AND PENDING: FISCAL YEAR 2010-FISCAL YEAR 2012, 3RD QUARTER
3 (2012), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/
Immigration%20Forms%20Data/Family-Based/I130-performancedata_fy12_qtr3.pdf.
82. Although nationwide statistics are not available on the type of representation that
persons seeking immigration benefits receive, smaller, more localized studies help shed some
light on the likely breakdowns. For example, over an almost ten-month period in New York, 
only about 7 percent of the individuals represented in immigration court did not hire private
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variety of forms: private attorneys, pro bono attorneys, law school
clinics, and nonprofit legal services organizations.83 Of these var-
ious options, private attorneys are by far the most common choice,
as 93 percent of the applicants who are represented hire a private
attorney.84 According to one survey completed in New York, about
6.5 percent of represented defendants in immigration courts choose
to be represented by nonprofit organizations or law school clinics,85
which includes a number of nonlawyers. Given that hundreds of
thousands of persons filter through immigration court each year,86
this means that a rather significant number may be represented by
nonattorneys. If the protections of Model Rule 4.2 do not apply to
the applicants represented by nonlawyers in this sizeable group, it
is possible they could be the targets of potentially unethical conduct
by federal immigration agents.
However, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not explic-
itly state that they apply a different ethical standard to a person
represented by nonlawyers.87 In fact, the Model Rules and the
federal regulations on immigration proceedings only lend support to
an argument for applying the same standard of protection for either
category of represented persons.88 For example, although the text of
Model Rule 4.2 refers only to persons represented by “another
lawyer,”89 the comments to the Rule do not distinguish between
different categories of “represented persons,”90 indicating the
possibility that all represented persons are protected from contact
lacking consent under the Rule.
attorneys. Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigration Representation Study Report, Accessing
Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L.
REV. 357, 381 (2011).
83. Id. The study found that of represented immigrants, the breakdown of who supplied
the representation was as follows: 93 percent private attorneys, 1 percent pro bono attorneys,
0.5 percent law school clinics, and 6 percent nonprofit legal service organizations. Id. 
84. Id.
85. Id. As a caveat, some nonprofit organizations employ licensed attorneys. Additionally,
law school clinics generally have a supervising attorney.
86. In the fiscal year of 2011, EOIR recorded 430,574 cases brought in immigration court.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 80, at B2.
87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2013) (making no explicit distinction
between protections for people represented by lawyers and those represented by nonlawyers).
88. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.1, 292.5 (2013); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 2. 
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2.
90. See id. R. 4.2 cmt. 2.
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Additionally, the federal regulations standardizing immigra-
tion proceedings specifically allow for persons in immigration
court to be represented by nonlawyers.91 Further regulations do not
differentiate between the various categories of possible representa-
tion, treating all representatives the same.92 Because the federal
regulations do not distinguish between lawyer and nonlawyer
representation, the ambiguity in the Model Rules should be resolved
in favor of equal protection among the various classes of representa-
tion.93 However, even if a court determines that Model Rule 4.2 does
not apply to situations in which an applicant is represented by a
nonlawyer, there should be nothing barring application of the Rule
in the cases in which represented applicants are represented by
lawyers.
2. The Question of Consent
The other main stumbling block for applicants alleging unethical
behavior by OCC and OCG is the question of whether they have
already consented to unannounced visits by FDNS and, therefore;
waived their right to challenge such visits as unethical.
As an initial matter, Comment 3 to Model Rule 4.2 clearly states
that the Rule “applies even though the represented person initiates
or consents to the communication.”94 This means that in the forty
91. 8 C.F.R. § 292.1(a) (“A person entitled to representation may be represented by any
of the following ... (1) Attorneys in the United States[,] (2) Law students and law graduates
not yet admitted to the bar[,] ... [3] Any reputable individual of good moral character[,] ... [4]
A person representing an organization who has been accredited by the Board[,] ... [5]
Accredited officials. An accredited official, in the United States, of the government to which
an alien owes allegiance, if the official appears solely in his official capacity and with the
alien’s consent[,] (6) Attorneys outside the United States.”).
92. Id. § 292.5 (“Whenever a person is required by any of the provisions of this chapter to
give or be given notice; to serve or be served with any paper other than a warrant of arrest
or a subpoena; to make a motion; to file or submit an application or other document; or to
perform or waive the performance of any act, such notice, service, motion, filing, submission,
performance, or waiver shall be given by or to, served by or upon, made by, or requested of the
attorney or representative of record.”).
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope cmt. 15 (“The Rules
presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer’s role. That context includes court rules
and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and
substantive and procedural law in general. The Comments are sometimes used to alert
lawyers to their responsibilities under such other law.”).
94. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 3 (2013).
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states that have adopted the Model Rules and the Comments,95
whether or not an applicant consented to an FDNS home visit or
to an interview is irrelevant in determining whether or not OCC
and OGC have violated Model Rule 4.2. However, as of 2011, ten
states have adopted only the Model Rules, forgoing adoption of
the Comments.96 For applicants alleging ethical violations under
Rule 4.2 in those states, a more searching analysis is needed to
determine if those immigrants have consented to FDNS intrusion,
waiving their rights to challenge the governmental action. 
The only evidence of an applicant’s potential consent is their
signature on the I-130 Form used to apply for a Petition for Alien
Relative.97 The I-130 Form warns, “USCIS investigates claimed
relationships and verifies the validity of documents.”98 However,
because the U.S. citizen is the one who must file the I-130, any
consent conveyed through signing the Form would be applicable
only to interviews with the citizen spouse and not the alien benefi-
ciary.99
Assuming consent is a defense to a violation of Model Rule 4.2,100
the only sort of defense of consent that the Rules recognize—albeit
in terms of the lawyer-client relationship—is “informed consent.”101
As recognized by the Rules, “informed consent” requires that a client
“be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and
reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse
95. ABA CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., STATE ADOPTION OF THE ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND COMMENTS (May 23, 2011), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/comments.authcheckdam.pdf.
96. Id.
97. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM I-
130: PETITION FOR ALIEN RELATIVE (2012), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/I-
130.pdf.
98. Id. 
99. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., I-130,
PETITION FOR ALIEN RELATIVE (2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (click
on “Forms,” then scroll down to Form I-130 and click “Petition for Alien Relative”) (“Purpose
of Form: For citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United States to establish the
relationship to certain alien relatives who wish to immigrate to the United States.”).
100. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2013) (failing to state that consent
waives the protection of the Rule), with id. R. 1.7 (expressly stating that if “each affected
client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing,” that waives a conflict of interest under
the Rules).
101. See id. R. 1.7-1.9 (dealing with concurrent and successive attorney-client conflicts of
interest).
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effects on the interests of that client.”102 At a minimum, informed
consent under the Rules requires some level of “adequate informa-
tion and explanation”103 conveyed to the client as to what they are
consenting to.104
In determining whether or not an applicant made an informed
waiver, courts have usually undertaken fact-specific inquires of the
circumstances surrounding the waiver.105 Relevant factors in the
determination include the following: breadth of the waiver, scope of
the waiver, specificity of the waiver, and the sophistication of the
client.106 In evaluating the I-130 waiver under these factors, the
waiver’s biggest issue might be its lack of specificity.
The indefinite language of the I-130 Form—“USCIS investigates
... relationships and verifies ... documents”107—makes it difficult to
argue that the applicant knowingly consented to unannounced
FDNS visits to his home without the consent of his attorney,108 or to
waiving a future claim under Model Rule 4.2.109 The vagueness of
the I-130 form is made particularly apparent when compared with
USCIS’s I-129 Form, which is used to apply for H1-B work visas.110
Similar to immediate-relative visas and the I-130 Form, FDNS
sporadically verifies the information submitted in the I-129 Form
through unannounced site visits.111
However, unlike the I-130 Form, the I-129 Form is explicit in its
disclosure of the possibility of FDNS’s verification of the submitted
data. The “signature” section of the I-129 Form reads, “I also recog-
nize that supporting evidence may be verified by USCIS through
102. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 18; see also id. R. 1.0 (“ ‘Informed consent’ denotes the agreement by a
person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate
information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives
to the proposed course of conduct.”).
103. Id. R. 1.0.
104. Id. (“ ‘Informed consent’ denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of
conduct.”).
105. See, e.g., Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. First Data Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1106 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
106. Id. 
107. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 99.
108. See Bernstein, supra note 6.
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2. 
110. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM
I-129: PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER (2012), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
files/form/i-129.pdf.
111. Id.
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any means determined appropriate by USCIS, including but not
limited to, on-site compliance reviews.”112 Given the increased
specificity of the I-129’s language, it is more plausible that that
provision, as opposed to the more vague disclaimer in the I-130
Form, might support a claim of informed consent. However, because
the I-130 Form lacks any similar specific language, the government
might be unable to meet its burden of “informed consent.”
The other judge-made factors in determining “informed consent”
do not appear to help the government’s case. For the same reason
the waiver lacks specificity—it is so vague as to give the applicant
little idea of what she consented to—the waiver also lacks breadth
and scope. Further, the sophistication of most applicants—especially
given language barriers113—is likely low, rendering their proffered
consent less meaningful. Because a fact-specific analysis of the
circumstances surrounding an I-130 applicant’s consent likely would
not indicate that the ramifications of signing the waiver were fully
disclosed or communicated to the applicant, it seems unlikely that
a court would find that an applicant gave their informed consent to
any ex parte interviews without their counsel present.
Additionally, Model Rule 4.2 requires “the consent of the other
lawyer”114 and makes no mention of the consent of the represented
person,115 leaving open the interpretation that the represented
person’s consent, if actually deemed given in this situation, would
be irrelevant to the court’s determination of whether OCC and OGC
breached the Rule. The question of consent is an unclear one, but
due to the vague language in the I-130 Form116 and the possible
irrelevance under Model Rule 4.2 of the client’s consent,117 it seems
unlikely that a court would hold that an applicant, by signing the I-
130 Form, has consented to the possibility of a surprise FDNS visit
to their home without the presence of their counsel.
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that OCC and OGC
are likely violating Model Rule 4.2 by authorizing FDNS to conduct
112. Id. 
113. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
114. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2.
115. Id. (making no mention of the consent of the represented person). But see id.
(referencing specifically the consent of the “other lawyer” as being a waiver of the ethical
boundaries dictating communications with the represented person).
116. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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home visits to represented I-130 applicants’ homes without the prior
approval of the applicants’ counsel. That these visits are in viola-
tion of the Model Rules raises the interesting question of whether
conduct by federal attorneys in other contexts is likewise uneth-
ical.118 However, determining that the conduct of the OCC and OGC
is unethical is not the end of the analysis. The appropriate remedy
for this ethical violation must be determined.
IV. RIGHTING THE WRONG: WHAT REMEDY BEST RECTIFIES 
THE HARM?
In discussing potential remedies, the most basic question is what
court would have jurisdiction over an appeal of a denied I-130
petition; the two most likely contenders are the Board of Immi-
gration Affairs (BIA)119 or a federal district court.120 Discipline for
attorney misconduct, including ethical violations, in the BIA is
governed under federal regulations and subject to DHS attorney
discipline procedures.121
118. First and foremost, other site visits by FDNS, including in the context of both the H1-
B visa program and religious workers visa program, may also be unethical under the same
reasoning as applied in the marriage-fraud context. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying
text (discussing similar on-site visits for I-129 visits); see also GAO-06-259, supra note 3, at
16 (finding FDNS investigated religious worker applications as part of a series of “fraud
assessments”); Questions & Answers: USCIS Publishes Final Rule for Religious Worker Visa
Classifications, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov (search “final rule
religious”; then follow “Questions & Answers: USCIS Publishes ... ” link) (last updated Nov.
21, 2008); supra note 75 (explaining H1-B work visa site visits). IRS agents also may be
implicated when, once they have begun an audit, they conduct a surprise visit on the person
being audited. See Surprise Visit by IRS Likely Trouble, WASH. TIMES (July 13, 2009),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/13/surprise-visit-by-irs-is-likely-to-be-
trouble/?feat=article_related_stories.
119. Once an alien’s I-130 is denied, the applicant can appeal the USCIS decision to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Questions and Answers: Appeals and Motions, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov (search “questions and answers:
appeals and motions”; then click on first link) (last updated Dec. 31, 2013).
120. A BIA decision is reviewable in federal court under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS (2011), available at http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm. For more information about the APA, see generally 5 U.S.C.
§ 551 (2012) and ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUMMARY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT (2014), available at http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-administrative-
procedure-act.
121. See 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(i) (2013).
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In federal court, including the district courts in which aliens can
appeal a denied I-130 petition,122 the “appropriate remedy for the
breach of an ethical rule must be based on the facts of each case.”123
Potential sanctions for an ethical violation include the following:
monetary sanctions like attorney fees,124 disqualification125 or dis-
barment126 of the offending attorney, dismissal of the pending
litigation,127 reprimand or admonition,128 probation,129 or exclusion
of the tainted evidence from the proceeding.130 In determining which
sanction is most appropriate in any given case, the court can look at
a variety of factors.131
A. The ABA’s Recommended Sanction
In addition to judge-made factors, the ABA has developed a model
to help courts determine which sanctions are appropriate for
unethical conduct.132 The ABA recommends that a court consider-
ing sanctions first answer four questions: “(1) What ethical duty
did the lawyer violate?[,] (2) What was the lawyer’s mental state?[,]
(3) What was the extent of the ... injury caused by the lawyer’s
misconduct?[,] and (4) Are there any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances?”133 A violation of Model Rule 4.2 is considered a
breach of the lawyer’s duty to the legal system,134 and the ABA’s
122. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
123. Faison v. Thorton, 863 F. Supp. 1204, 1215 (D. Nev. 1993).
124. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994, 909 F. Supp.
1116, 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Monetary sanctions can include the court awarding the applicant
all reasonable attorney fees and costs related to the litigation. Id. 
125. Faison, 863 F. Supp. at 1216.
126. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 14 (2005).
127. Faison, 863 F. Supp. at 1217.
128. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 126, at 15.
129. Id. 
130. United States v. Grass, 239 F. Supp. 2d 535, 546 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
131. These factors include: (1) the severity of the violation, (2) whether the attorney acted
intentionally, (3) any prejudice the parties have suffered or will suffer due to the violation,
and (4) the right of any party to be represented by counsel of their choice. Faison, 863 F. Supp.
at 1215; In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994, 909 F. Supp.
1116, 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
132. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 126, at 9.
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 10 (“Lawyers are officers of the court, and must abide by the rules of substance
and procedure which shape the administration of justice. Lawyers must always operate within
the bounds of the law, and cannot create or use false evidence, or engage in any other illegal
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model would likely categorize the mental state of OCC and OGC in
violating that rule as either intentional, the most culpable mental
state,135 or knowledgeable.136 A finding of an “intentional” mental
state would be appropriate if OCC or OGC knew that FDNS was
breaking Model Rule 4.2 and still permitted FDNS to perform visits.
However, if OCC or OGC sent FDNS on home visits, which they
knew involved contacting a represented person, but did not know
was in violation of Model Rule 4.2, then they would likely have
acted only “knowingly.”
Assuming there are no aggravating or mitigating factors
present,137 under § 6.3 of the ABA’s model, “Improper Communica-
tions with Individuals in the Legal System,”138 the recommended
sanction for OCC and OGC attorneys would likely be suspension.139
Given the severity of the ABA’s suggested penalty, OCC and OGC
attorneys should think twice about letting FDNS agents conduct
unannounced home visits.
B. Suppression of Evidence
If a court found DHS attorneys had violated Model Rule 4.2,
however, the attorneys would not be the only ones in danger of
being thrown out of court; so too could the evidence that FDNS
agents had collected. Court-ordered suppression of evidence has a
or improper conduct.”).
135. Id. (“The most culpable mental state is that of intent, when the lawyer acts with the
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.”). 
136. Id. at 10 (“The next most culpable mental state is that of knowledge, when the lawyer
acts with conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of his or her conduct
both without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.”).
137. However, if a government attorney had been sanctioned before for any offense, that
might be an aggravating factor; if the attorney had a clean record, that could be considered
a mitigating factor. See id. at 26-28. 
138. Id. at 23 (“The following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving
attempts to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror, or other official by means prohibited
by law.”). Although this description is not completely analogous to the marriage-fraud home
visit context, § 6.3 does reference communications to “an individual in the legal system,”
which would include any party in a case, such as an alien petitioner. Id. 
139. Id. (“Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in communication
with an individual in the legal system when the lawyer knows that such communication is
improper, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or causes interference or potential
interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.”).
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fabled history in American jurisprudence,140 and courts still retain
their “inherent supervisory power” to exclude evidence when
warranted by the circumstances.141 In a court’s determination
whether to exercise its supervisory power, it should look to see if
such an exercise would accord with the underlying purposes of the
power.142 If the government’s right to present the evidence it
collected from the applicant’s home outweighs any of the exclusion-
ary rule’s three purposes, suppressing the evidence would be
improper.143
In immigration proceedings, however, use of the exclusionary rule
has been historically different.144 In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,145 the
Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule was not to be applied
in INS civil deportation hearings.146 The Court came to this
conclusion after weighing the social costs and benefits of excluding
illegally obtained evidence in civil deportation hearings.147 The
Court found that there was no real social benefit to applying the
exclusionary rule because applying the rule would have little
deterrent effect on government officers, due to the low evidentiary
burden faced by the government in proving that an alien was
unlawfully present and the high likelihood that the alien would
140. The Supreme Court, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914), first elucidated the idea that a court’s decision to exclude “otherwise
relevant and probative evidence” could be a proper remedy to police misconduct that violates
the Constitution. United States v. Grass, 239 F. Supp. 2d 535, 546 (M.D. Pa. 2003). The
purpose behind the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct while still
preserving the role of the jury or judge in determining the ultimate issue. Id. Consequently,
“the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence is sanctioned only where the need to curb
Government misconduct outweighs the public’s very substantial right to every man’s
evidence.” Id. (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960)). Suppression of
evidence, as a judicial remedy, is not limited to constitutional violations. Id. Courts have an
“inherent supervisory power,” which allows them to suppress evidence garnered through
illegal conduct. Id.
141. Grass, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 546; see United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).
142. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505. The underlying purposes of the supervisory powers “are
threefold: to implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights; to preserve judicial
integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate consideration validly before
the jury; and finally, as a remedy designed to deter illegal conduct.” Id. (citations omitted).
143. Grass, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
144. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).
145. Id.
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 1041.
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voluntarily agree to departure.148 In contrast, the Court found that
applying the exclusionary rule would result in a high social cost
because releasing aliens unlawfully in the country due to an
unreasonable search would allow them to further their offense of
unlawfully being in the country.149
But Lopez-Mendoza has never been held to apply to all civil
immigration proceedings—just to civil deportation hearings.
Further, the justifications that led the Court to find the exclusion-
ary rule not warranted in Lopez-Mendoza are not applicable to an
APA-based review of an I-130 denial. First, in marriage-fraud cases,
unethically obtained evidence could constitute either the entirety,
or a substantial part of, the government’s proof against the appli-
cant.150 Second, unlike unlawfully present aliens soon to be de-
ported, there is no data to suggest that denied I-130 applicants
would depart on their own voluntarily.151 Therefore, unlike in the
case of deportation hearings, the harm faced by the I-130 applicant
from evidence obtained from home visits would be substantial.
In the marriage-fraud context, as distinct from deportation
hearings, suppressing evidence would produce minimal social costs.
Because most I-130 applicants are legally in the country and merely
lack permanent residency status,152 suppressing evidence in I-130
hearings would not further the crime cited in Lopez-Mendoza of
allowing a defendant to remain unlawfully in the country. However,
proponents of applying the Lopez-Mendoza rule to the marriage-
fraud context could argue that a different offense, fraud, is being
furthered through the suppression of evidence, and that, therefore,
there is a social cost to suppressing the evidence obtained through
home visits. Given the arguments on both sides of the debate, it is
difficult to predict whether a court would apply the Lopez-Mendoza
rule to I-130 home visits. Because courts could plausibly come down
either way on the issue, it is worth exploring the possibility of a court
applying the exclusionary rule in the context of I-130 applications.
148. Id. at 1043-47.
149. Id. at 1047-50.
150. See supra Part I.A.
151. Frequently, I-130 applicants have bona fide connections to the United States—most
commonly through marriage with a U.S. citizen. Accordingly, it is increasingly unlikely that
denied applicants would sever all ties within the United States and voluntarily leave the
country. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
152. See id.
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Assuming Lopez-Mendoza does not apply, exclusion of the
unethically obtained evidence would best serve the three goals
underlying the exclusionary rule.153 First, suppressing the evidence
would provide applicants a remedy for the government’s violation of
Model Rule 4.2. Second, suppression would preserve judicial
integrity by ensuring that the administrative record is free of
unethically obtained evidence. Third, suppression would deter
future unethical governmental conduct because government attor-
neys and officers would reconsider spending FDNS resources on
investigations that would be ultimately excluded from judicial
consideration. Furthermore, because the government’s evidence as
obtained has little probative value,154 the government’s right to
present such evidence does not outweigh the goals of exclusion.
However, nothing in this Note is meant to suggest that the govern-
ment should not retain the right to present evidence from a home
visit that complies with Rule 4.2. The restriction on the government
is only this: act ethically.
If the government’s evidence were suppressed, it would likely be
of some benefit to I-130 applicants. During appeals of I-130 denials,
the reviewing court is limited to only reviewing the evidence
contained in the administrative record;155 removal of home visits
from the record could have a noticeable impact.156 Excluding
prejudicial evidence obtained from the home visits likely would
weaken the government’s case: predicating a higher probability of
a court finding that the agency action was “arbitrary, capricious, an
153. See supra note 142. 
154. As explained earlier, due to the language barriers and inability of applicants to
interact with investigators in productive fashion, these surprise home visits may be no more
indicative of marriage fraud than evidence obtained through a standard fraud interview. See
supra note 80 and accompanying text.
155. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“To the extent necessary ... the reviewing court shall ... hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... (A) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.... In making the
foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by
a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”).
156. For an example of a court discussing USCIS reliance on evidence obtained through
USCIS home inspections, see generally Berrios v. Holder, 502 F. App’x 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“USCIS relied on this fact of [alien petitioner’s] presence at his ex-wife’s home [as observed
by USCIS agents on a surprise inspection of his home] on one occasion to deny the petition.”).
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abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”157
However, because Congress has delegated to USCIS the responsibil-
ity for enforcing the immigration laws of this country, the courts
must afford the agency “[a]ppropriate deference”;158 with that tough
standard to overcome, it is still an uphill battle for immigrants to
win an appeal of an I-130 denial.
C. Policy as Relevant to the Remedy
Determining the appropriate remedial measure for an ethical
violation necessarily requires some sort of policy determination.159
Courts have flexibility in deciding what, if any, sanctions are
appropriate in a given case.160 Given that flexibility, policy can
play a role in swinging a court one way or another on a particular
issue.161 In the case of FDNS visits to applicants’ homes, policy
arguments can be made to support both sides of the issue.
In one sense, the potential remedies and sanctions a court could
impose on USCIS attorneys could be a victory for immigrants. First,
immigrants will be judged only by evidence that is collected
ethically.162 Additionally, interviews for which the applicant’s
attorney is present should produce the “best” evidence since those
applicants who appear suspicious due to nerves or language barriers
will have a third party there to assist them in the interview. Finally,
OCC and OGC will have an incentive to engage in ethical behavior.
Considering that ethical rules are promulgated to ensure lawyers,
as professionals, meet a certain industry standard to protect the
157. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also Berrios, 502 F. App’x at 103 (removing governmental
reliance on the USCIS home visit predicated the Second Circuit’s reversal of denial of I-130
petition).
158. INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 19 (1982).
159. See, e.g., supra notes 140-43, 153 and accompanying text (explaining the underlying
policy rationale for the exclusionary rule). 
160. See Faison v. Thornton, 863 F. Supp. 1204, 1215 (D. Nev. 1993).
161. Policy and the law go hand-in-hand in a variety of legal subject matters. For an
example of policy playing a role in a contracts case, see A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058
(Mass. 2000) (“It is well-established that courts will not enforce contracts that violate public
policy. While courts are hesitant to invalidate contracts on these public policy grounds, the
public interest in freedom of contract is sometimes outweighed by other public policy
considerations; in those cases the contract will not be enforced.”) (citations omitted).
162. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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integrity and reputation of the profession,163 and that government
lawyers set an example for the rest of the country, OCC should be
encouraged in every way possible to conform to the ethical stan-
dards.164
From the perspective of USCIS, however, discontinuing surprise
marriage-fraud home visits would be a societal loss. Removing these
surprise visits very likely would allow some instances of marriage
fraud to escape notice. Keeping those immigrants who do not legally
belong in the United States out of the United States is a legitimate
public interest.165 Admitting non-law-abiding residents does not
benefit the country, and, once in the country, such residents may
negatively impact public and national security.166 The federal gov-
ernment always has an interest in ensuring compliance with
established law.167 However, because society expects the government
to also abide by those laws, the government must balance its
enforcement of the laws with society’s expectation of a lawful
government.
Even having only briefly considered both perspectives, it seems
USCIS is better served by abandoning its practice of conducting
unannounced home visits. Assuming that the relatively small
number of fraudulent marriages are uncovered after the fraud
interview,168 there is little reason the government should engage in
unethical conduct when it has legitimate investigative tools at its
disposal.169 The benefit of home visits is outweighed by the sanctions
163. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 126, at 9 (“In the legal profession, the community has
allowed the profession the right of self-regulation. As stated in the Preamble to the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct[,] ‘[t]he legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with
it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that
its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-
interested concerns of the bar.’”).
164. See LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
5 (3d ed. 2012).
165. See Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, supra note 12.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Hickman, 183 U.S. 53, 59 (1901) (explaining that
there is a “governmental interest in the welfare of all its citizens, in compelling obedience to
the legal orders of all its officials, and in securing compliance with its laws”).
168. See Burke, supra note 50. Because FDNS does not release data on the success rate of
its site visits in uncovering marriage fraud, it is impossible to definitively say how useful
these visits are in uncovering fraud missed during the initial interview. See supra note 11 and
accompanying text. 
169. For the powers afforded immigration officers, see generally 8 C.F.R. § 287.5 (2011).
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a court could impose on the government, the loss of credibility of
government attorneys in front of various tribunals, and the threat
to legitimately married immigrants going through the process of
becoming legal residents.170
CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD IN INVESTIGATING BENEFIT FRAUD
By authorizing unannounced home visits by FDNS, USCIS
attorneys are violating Model Rule 4.2. Regardless of whether an I-
130 applicant is represented by a lawyer or a layperson, USCIS is
purposefully circumventing its legal channel of communication with
the applicant via the representing party in order to “surprise” the
applicant into revealing incriminating evidence. This practice is
both unproductive and unethical, and USCIS must either modify or
eliminate it. Until these home visits are discontinued, or performed
with the consent of the applicant’s counsel or representative, USCIS
is engaging in the same sort of deceitful behavior it seeks to prevent
in applicants.
If this study of marriage fraud shows anything, it is that USCIS
is going to great lengths, perhaps even greater than it knows, to
catch fraud. While USCIS, FDNS, and the OCC and OGC lawyers
that oversee USCIS cannot be criticized for a lack of diligence, that
does not change the fact that the government appears to be wasting
time and effort aggressively searching for something that only
rarely can be found. Although there is no denying that those who
perpetuate fraud should be held accountable for such deceitful acts,
it does not follow that government attorneys should act unethically
to ferret out the wrongdoers.
It should not be forgotten that there are ethical measures USCIS
can take to investigate potential marriage fraud. Perhaps the
simplest solution would be just informing the applicant’s counsel of
an impending visit by FDNS before the fact; although FDNS would
lose the “element of surprise,” those couples who do not actually live
together will still have a difficult time in altering their purported
home to project the idea that a married couple is living there.
Alternatively, FDNS could use the home visit, once consented to, to
170. See Nina Bernstein, Wed in 1993, but Stuck in Immigration Limbo, N.Y. TIMES (June
13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/nyregion/14marriage.html?pagewanted=all.
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gather valuable information for use by USCIS in subsequent
interviews of the couple. Instead of using the home visit to “sur-
prise” fraudulent couples and “catch” them in the act of lying, the
home visits could be a way to gather valuable information for
USCIS. FDNS could make a note of something as simple as what
shampoo the couple uses and then convey that information to
USCIS to use in questioning the couple individually about it in a
subsequent interview. Such precise questioning would be difficult
indeed for sham couples. As the situation presently stands, USCIS
is only shooting itself in the proverbial foot: it is engaging in
unethical conduct while learning very little, and whatever it does
learn could potentially be suppressed or its attorneys will face the
possibility of sanctions for such conduct. Right now the situation is
lose-lose.
John F. Kennedy, quoting John Winthrop, once remarked that, as
Americans, “[w]e must always consider that ... the eyes of all people
are upon us.”171 Kennedy continued,“[O]ur governments, in every
branch, at every level, national, state and local, must be as a city
upon a hill—constructed and inhabited by men aware of their great
trust and their great responsibilities.”172 The federal government,
and its agents, should be models for the rest of the country. They
should not engage in unethical conduct, especially not to combat a
threat that is more myth than reality. Marriage fraud and, more
generally, benefit fraud exist. But the price OCC and OGC are
paying to uncover such fraud is not worth the cost.
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